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ÔTrust is BasicÕ: L¿gstrup on the Priority of Trust 
 
Robert Stern 
 
In the course of his deeply interesting analysis of the place of trust in our lives, 
the Danish philosopher and theologian Knud Ejler L¿gstrup makes the claim 
that Ôtrust is basicÕ, in a sense that somehow puts it prior to mistrust.1 I take it 
that there is something intuitively plausible about this remark; but at the same 
time it is not entirely clear what it amounts to or involves. What kind of 
basicness or priority are we talking about here? My aim in this paper is to 
consider different responses to this question that might be found in L¿gstrupÕs 
work, and thus to illuminate what I take to be distinctive in his account of trust. 
However, before doing so I will say a little about the role that his discussion of 
                                                        
1 L¿gstrup is not the only philosopher to have this view in some form or other. 
In particular, some of the same issues discussed below have come up in 
discussions of WittgensteinÕs remarks about trust in On Certainty. Cf. 
Hertzberg 1988 and Lagerspetz 1998, especially chapter 8. While Lagerspetz 
mainly focuses on Wittgenstein, he also brings L¿gstrup into his final account: 
see chapter 9. Bob Plant has briefly but illuminatingly connected 
WittgensteinÕs views on trust with DerridaÕs views, for example the latterÕs 
claim that Ôelementary trust…is involved…in every address of the other. From 
the very first instant it is co-extensive with this other and thus conditions every 
Òsocial bondÓ, every questioning, all knowledge, performativityÕ (Derrida 1998, 
63); see Plant 2005, 188-90. There is also an interesting parallel between 
L¿gstrupÕs claim about the priority of trust over mistrust, and LevinasÕs claim 
that while we can of course encounter others with Ôviolence, hate and disdainÕ, 
nonetheless what is ÔprimaryÕ because it is Ôpresupposed in all human 
relationshipsÕ is instead Ôthe mastery of the Other [over oneself] and his 
poverty, with my submission [to the Other] and his wealthÕ (Levinas 1985, 89). 
One could ask questions concerning exactly what ÔprimacyÕ Levinas has in 
mind that parallel the questions we will ask about L¿gstrup, where I suspect a 
similar answer could be given. 
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trust plays in L¿gstrupÕs writings, as these are not well-known in Anglophone 
philosophy, so some preliminary introductory comments are required. 
 
1. Trust in L¿gstrup 
L¿gstrup was born in 1905 and died in 1981. He lived through the Nazi 
occupation of Denmark, and in the middle of this period became professor of 
theology at the University of Aarhus in 1943, where he spent the rest of his 
academic life. He published what is widely seen as his main text, The Ethical 
Demand, in 1956. This is the work in which his principal account of trust is 
developed, and which I will focus on in this paper. I will also discuss some 
later works where L¿gstrup responds to criticisms (ÔRejoinderÕ in Art and 
Ethics (1961)), and also somewhat develops his earlier views (Controverting 
Kierkegaard (1968) and Norm and Spontaneity (1972)).2 
It is therefore helpful to say something very briefly about where 
L¿gstrupÕs account of trust fits into the structure of The Ethical Demand. The 
book begins by focusing on Ôthe religious proclamation of Jesus of NazarethÕ, 
namely the proclamation to Ôlove your neighbour as yourselfÕ, which L¿gstrup 
says he will try to define in Ôstrictly human termsÕ (L¿gstrup 1997, 1/2010, 9). 
L¿gstrup asks how we should understand this proclamation and what it 
Ôanswers to in our existenceÕ3 (L¿gstrup 1997, 1/2010, 9), arguing in response 
that it rests on our interdependence, on the fact that Ôthe other person must to 
such a degree be dependent upon me that what I do and say in the 
relationship between us Ð I alone and nobody else, here and now and not at 
                                                        
2 The Ethical Demand is available in English as L¿gstrup 1997. The 
ÔRejoinderÕ and extracts from the other works mentioned are available in 
translation in L¿gstrup 2007. In references to L¿gstrup, a translation is given 
first where available, followed by the most recent Danish edition.  
3 The Danish term L¿gstrup uses here is Ôtilv¾relseÕ, which could also be 
translated as ÔlifeÕ, and indeed both terms are used by the translators of the 
English edition of The Ethical Demand. As we shall see, this connection to life 
and its proper development are important in what follows, so this should be 
born in mind. L¿gstrup also uses Ôtilv¾relseÕ as his translation of HeideggerÕs 
term ÔDaseinÕ. 
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some other time or in some other manner Ð is of decisive importanceÕ 
(L¿gstrup 1997, 5/2010, 13). He then argues that to further understand the 
nature of this interdependence we need to focus on trust, as the logic of trust 
can give us insight into the ethical demand that the proclamation embodies, 
where he distinguishes between the ethical demand as such and what might 
be asked of us by the ordinary conventional requirements of moral life. 
L¿gstrup then argues that this demand only makes sense if we see life as a 
gift. He finally considers objections to his account, including objections to his 
account of trust. Clearly this complete picture raises a number of crucial 
questions which cannot be considered here, particularly L¿gstrupÕs 
characterization of the ethical demand as what he calls radical, silent, one-
sided, isolating and unfulfillable; how it is to be distinguished from the 
requirements of social morality and how they relate to each other, if at all; and 
what he means by calling life a gift.  But this sketch of the basic structure of 
The Ethical Demand should help to see how the discussion of trust in the first 
chapter fits in, where that structure is helpfully outlined by L¿gstrup in another 
work as follows: 
First I analyze how the life of one person is interwoven with the life of 
another, and from this I deduce the content of the ethical demand, 
which has to do with taking care of the life of the other person that has 
been surrendered to us. Some way into the book I make it clear that 
the one-sidedness of the demand…presupposes that life has been 
given to the individual person. (L¿gstrup 2007, 10/1961, 239) 
L¿gstrupÕs account of trust relates centrally to this theme of 
surrendering oneÕs life to another person, as he thinks this is fundamental to 
the nature of trust. In general, for L¿gstrup Ô[t]o trust…is to lay oneself openÕ 
(L¿gstrup 1997, 9/2010, 18), which is why he believes that understanding 
trust is a good way to understand our interdependence, without which the 
proclamation would not make much sense: 
If human beings were so independent of one another that the words 
and deeds of one were only a dispensable luxury in the life of another 
and my failure in the life of the neighbour could easily be made up 
later, then GodÕs relation to me would not be as intimately tied up with 
my relation to the neighbour as the proclamation of Jesus declares it to 
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be.4 In short, the intimate connection in which Jesus places our relation 
to God and our relation to the neighbour presupposes that we are, as 
Luther expressed it, Òdaily breadÓ in the life of one another. And this 
presupposition for the intimate connection in the proclamation of Jesus 
between the two great commandments in the law can indeed be 
described in strictly human terms. (L¿gstrup 1997, 5/2010, 13-14) 
Trust is therefore important to L¿gstrup because it reveals how that 
interdependence works: in trusting another person, I am placed in their hands 
and make myself vulnerable to them, while also expecting that ÔsurrenderÕ of 
myself to play a role in their response to me; if they do not respond 
accordingly, I will feel resentment and hurt in a way that can quickly become 
moralized, sometimes in exaggerated ways.  
This therefore gives us a way to locate L¿gstrup in relation to 
contemporary debates on trust, which have largely gone on without reference 
to his work. Most of those debates trace themselves back to Annette BaierÕs 
key article of 1986 on ÔTrust and AntitrustÕ, where she begins by saying that 
Ôthere has been a strange silence on the topic [of trust] in the tradition of moral 
philosophy with which I am familiarÕ (Baier 1986, 232),5 and then proceeds to 
introduce certain key distinctions and issues that have now become central, 
such as the way the ubiquitousness of trust can make it invisible; the 
difference between relying on something or someone and trusting someone; 
the way in which trust involves dependence on the good will of a person, and 
thus a vulnerability to harm, leading to her account of trust as Ôaccepted 
vulnerability to anotherÕs possible but not expected ill will (or lack of good will) 
                                                        
4 Cf. Matthew 22:36-40, which has Jesus saying that what he identifies as the 
second most important law, namely to love your neighbor as yourself, is like 
the Ôfirst and greatest commandmentÕ to ÔLove the Lord your God with all your 
heart and with all soul and with all your mindÕ, thus linking love of God with 
love of the neighbour. 
5 Hertzberg, writing around the same time as Baier, makes a similar point: 
ÔThere does not seem to have been a great deal of discussion about the 
concept of trust in recent philosophyÕ (Hertzberg 1998, 308). 
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toward oneÕ (Baier 1986, 235);6 and the consequent role of power within trust 
relations. BaierÕs paper, and related work by her and others, has opened up a 
debate between two broad views of trust which have been called ÔpredictiveÕ 
and ÔaffectiveÕ.7 On the predictive approach, trust involves dependence where 
the expectation that this dependence will be satisfied is grounded on evidence 
that the trusted person can be relied upon in various ways (e.g. to speak the 
truth), where this evidence can come from various sources, such as past 
experience of her behaviour, and what one knows about her interests and 
character. In this sense, I can trust the used car dealer to sell me a good car, 
perhaps because she has done so in the past, or I know her fear of 
reputational damage will lead her to do so now. By contrast, on the affective 
approach, trust still involves dependence, but here that dependence is itself 
assumed to play a role in motivating the trusted party to act accordingly. Thus, 
in such cases you will feel Ôlet downÕ by the other, and therefore blame them, 
whereas if your attitude of trust was based on evidence of reliability, this 
would not be appropriate: if our attitude in trusting was evidential there would 
be no space for blame of this sort. Thus, if the car dealer sells me a duff car 
where I was trusting her in the first sense, I might feel annoyed at myself for 
having miscalculated where her interests lie and so having misplaced my 
                                                        
6 To give BaierÕs discussion in slightly more detail: ÔWhen I trust another, I 
depend on her good will toward me… Where one depends on anotherÕs good 
will, one is necessarily vulnerable to the limits of that good will. One leaves 
others opportunities to harm one when one trusts, and also shows confidence 
that they will not take it… Trust then, on this first approximation, is accepted 
vulnerability to anotherÕs possible but not expected ill will (or lack of good will) 
towards oneÕ (Baier 1986, 235). 
7 I am here following FaulknerÕs terminology, which is itself partly drawing on 
Hollis. See e.g. Faulkner 2014, 1977-8, where he draws the contrast as 
follows: ÔTo say that A trusts S to φ on this [predictive] understanding is just to 
say that A depends on S φ-ing and expects S to φ…. [But on the affective] 
understanding to say that A trusts S to φ is to say that A depends on S φ-ing 
and expects this to motivate S to φÕ. Cf. also Faulkner 2007 and 2011, and 
Hollis 1998. 
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judgement of how she would respond to me by basing that on the wrong 
evidence, but I would not feel resentment towards her; it is only if I trusted her 
in the second sense, and expected my hopelessness with cars to play some 
role in her response to me that I would feel in any way betrayed. And if I 
expected her to be trustworthy in the second sense, but found her to only be 
trustworthy in the first, I might also feel let down, in again realizing that my 
vulnerability was playing no real role in her relation to me. As a result, it is 
common in the literature to draw a distinction between trust as reliability and 
hence dependability in that sense, and trust proper: you might be dependable 
and I might depend on you, because your interests make it the case that you 
will do the best you can for me, and you are good at this; but this is not the 
same as being trustworthy, as my dependence on you plays no role in how or 
why you serve my interests (just as I might depend on a rope to hold me, but 
where this is not really a case of trust in a full sense).8 
 From what has been said above about L¿gstrupÕs position, it should be 
clear that he is centrally concerned with trust in the second sense, as crucially 
involving our vulnerability to others and the role this plays and is expected to 
play in their response to us. Had L¿gstrupÕs work on trust been more widely 
known and appreciated at the time, it might then have had the sort of impact 
on the debate that was made later by the contributions of Baier and others 
who have followed her lead. 
 
2. ÔTrust is BasicÕ 
We have now outlined the place that the consideration of trust has in 
L¿gstrupÕs work, and what view he takes of it. I now want to focus on a central 
part of L¿gstrupÕs discussion of trust, namely his claim regarding the 
basicness of trust, and that is it somehow prior to mistrust: ÔTrust and distrust 
                                                        
8 Cf. the contemporary debate, where those who defend the affective view 
include Annette Baier, Paul Faulkner, Karen Jones and Richard Holton, while 
those on the predictive side include Russell Hardin, Alvin Goldman, Michael 
Bacharach and Pamela Hieronymi. Central texts include: Baier 1986; 
Faulkner 2011; Gambetta 1988; Goldman 2011; Hardin 1996; Holton 1994; 
Hieronymi, 2008; Jones 1996.  
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are not two parallel ways of life. Trust is basic; distrust is the absence of trustÕ 
(L¿gstrup 1997, 18 note 5/2010, 28 note 1). 9  How is this idea to be 
understood? 
 I will consider four main options:  
(1) Psychological: trust is the attitude we start out with, not distrust 
[developmental priority] 
(2) Transcendental: trust is warranted as the default attitude, grounded in 
the necessary conditions of our fundamental practices, distrust is not 
[rational priority] 
(3) Value: trust is a prima facie good, so distrust can only be a privation or 
deficient form of trust [axiological priority] 
(4) Ontological: that trust is possible is not a result of our social 
arrangements, but is essential to the proper functioning of human life 
itself, whereas distrust is not essential in this way [priority in being] 
I will now consider each of the four options above in turn, arguing in the end 
that it is the third and fourth that seems to best capture L¿gstrupÕs position 
while building on elements of the other two, so following this development will 
show us how he came to understand the nature of trust. 
 
2.1 Psychological priority 
In his writing on this issue, it sometimes sounds as if L¿gstrup has 
psychological priority in mind: namely, as a matter of human psychology and 
its development, we all first encounter people with trust, and then come to 
learn to distrust when things go wrong (or we are taught they might). The 
opening chapter of The Ethical Demand where he first talks about trust could 
certainly be read this way: 
                                                        
9 While adequate, this translation is not very precise. A more literal translation 
of the Danish would be: ÔDistrust is therefore certainly not - as a way of being - 
equal to trust. Trust is what is fundamental - and distrust arises out of a lack of 
trust'. For the sake of simplicity in the paper I will continue to stick to the 
phrase used in the English translation, that Ôtrust is basicÕ, but where the 
emphasis on fundamentality should be borne in mind. 
  8 
It is characteristic of human life that we normally encounter one 
another with natural trust. This is true not only in the case of persons 
who are well acquainted with one another but also in the case of 
complete strangers. Only because of some special circumstances do 
we ever distrust a stranger in advance…Initially we believe one 
anotherÕs word; initially we trust one another. (L¿gstrup 1997, 8/2010, 
17)10 11 
And slightly later L¿gstrup also brings in psychological studies, especially 
those concerning human development: 
[T]he child, in contradistinction to the adult, is never able to trust only 
partially. To trust with reservation is possible only for one who has 
learned to hold back something of herself. But this the child has not 
learned consciously and deliberately to do. For her reservation takes 
place as a matter of psychic automatism. This is why the disappointed 
trust, restlessness, and insecurity which go with it create in the child 
far-reaching and fateful consequences. (L¿gstrup 1997, 15/2010, 25)12 
L¿gstrup seems to be arguing here that when a child distrusts, it takes a very 
different form from the adult case, as for the child it is total rather than being 
                                                        
10 Again, a more literal and accurate translation of the beginning of this 
quotation would be: ÔIt belongs to our human life, that we normally encounter 
one another with natural trust. This is not just the case when we meet a 
person we know well, but also holds when we meet a complete strangerÕ. The 
Danish original implies more clearly that trust is a deep part of that life, and 
L¿gstrup is talking to the reader more directly, asking them to recognize that 
this is what we do. 
11 Cf. Baier, who speaks about an Ôinnate but fragile trustÕ (1986, 242), arguing 
that we must suppose that Ôinfants emerge from the womb already equipped 
with some ur-confidence in what supports them, so that no choice is needed 
to continue with that attitude, until something happens to shake or destroy that 
attitudeÕ (Baier 1986, 244).  
12 Cf. also: ÔTrust is an original phenomenon. The child comes trustingly into 
the world, the child psychiatrist ascertainsÕ (L¿gstrup 1995, II, 355/2013b, 
230). 
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selective, which is why a child who learns to distrust is so psychologically 
damaged by the experience; but this in turn suggests that the attitude with 
which a child begins is not one in which trust and distrust are both in play (as 
is typical for adults), but one in which trust is complete, and hence basic in 
this sense Ð it is the attitude from which we start out, but which can be flipped 
round into its opposite in exceptional circumstances, with catastrophic 
psychological effects when this occurs. L¿gstrup also goes on to offer an 
explanation of why the child will begin with trust, which is that she is outside 
the various conventional norms, where it is those norms that make us Ôhold 
ourselves in reserve and do not allow ourselves completely to trust one 
anotherÕ (L¿gstrup 1997, 19/2010, 28), thereby using convention Ôas a means 
for keeping aloof from one another and for insulating ourselvesÕ (L¿gstrup 
1997, 20/2010, 30); but the child is Ôoutside conventionÕ, so Ôhe or she is able 
to trust only without reservationÕ (L¿gstrup 1997, 20/2010, 30). 
However, while there is reason to think from these passages that 
L¿gstrup might support this psychological priority claim, there is also reason 
to think it is not the fundamental issue for him. Firstly, to place too much 
weight on it would be to run counter to the methodology that he wants to 
adopt, which he insists is phenomenological rather than psychological. Thus, 
while he says that the psychology ÔsupportsÕ the position he holds, he does 
not claim that it is the basis for his view, which he identifies as primarily Ôan 
analysis of a phenomenological characterÕ (L¿gstrup 1997, 15/2010, 24). And 
elsewhere, he makes plain that he sees a significant difference between 
scientific claims and phenomenological ones.13  
                                                        
13 Ô[T]here are facts that everyday language is better at establishing than the 
sciences are. There are phenomena we can only describe and distinctions we 
can only express using natural language. That is why much philosophy 
remains within the interpretation of the world, of things, and of human 
existence that is given in our everyday language. Conversely, everyday 
languageÕs ÒsortingÓ of things is useless in attempts to track down the laws in 
which the exact sciences are interested. In order to track these down, we 
must carry out a new and different classification of things, and that is what 
takes place in the so-called scientific languages. But as I said earlier, I have 
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Secondly, but relatedly, when L¿gstrup deals with subsequent 
challenges to these more psychological passages from The Ethical Demand, 
he does so by downplaying the ÔscientificÕ nature of his position, suggesting 
that his priority thesis should not really be understood in these psychological 
terms. This can be seen clearly in one of his ÔRejoindersÕ, written in response 
to Henrik Stangerup, who argues against L¿gstrup that we normally meet one 
another with distrust, where trust only follows after as a Ôresult of the fulfillment 
of love or friendshipÕ (L¿gstrup 2007, 2/1961, 229).14 L¿gstrupÕs reply is as 
follows: 
To this I would say that the disagreement between Stangerup and 
myself is not merely, as he presumes, a question of what comes first 
and what comes last, trust or distrust. He and I take the words ÔfirstÕ 
and ÔlastÕ to mean different things. The difference can be pinned down 
as follows: Stangerup is inquiring into which of the two comes first in 
time, and which comes last, whereas I see the difference between first 
and last more as a difference in rank, having my sights set on the 
foundational relation. When Stangerup says that distrust comes first, 
he means Ð and this is also how he expresses himself Ð that in a 
personÕs historically progressing existence, trust Ôfollows afterÕ distrust. 
When I, on the other hand, say that trust is primary, I mean that distrust 
is the negation of trust, and is, as such, founded in trust. (L¿gstrup 
2007, 2/1961, 229) 
L¿gstrup goes on: 
 Whether Stangerup and I still disagree depends on the position he 
takes on the distinction I have made here, and which one could, 
perhaps, call a distinction between a psychological status report and an 
                                                                                                                                                              
not sought to establish scientific laws. This I leave to psychology, sociology, 
and similar sciences. In my description of the phenomena, I have only worked 
with comparisons and distinctions within the natural languageÕs interpretation 
of life. In short, I have stuck to phenomenological analyses and steered clear 
of scientific investigationsÕ (L¿gstrup 2007, 9-10/1961, 238). For a more 
extended discussion, see L¿gstrup 1987. 
14 The article L¿gstrup is responding to is Stangerup 1960. 
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investigation of the foundational relation. For if I am correct in 
perceiving StangerupÕs reflections on trust and distrust as such a status 
report, then I can follow his reasoning. The question is whether 
Stangerup, on his part, will concede that it is possible to practice a 
philosophical psychology that includes an explanation of the 
foundational relations, and whether he can follow my particular 
reasoning in favor of the foundational relation that I believe exists 
between trust and distrust. (L¿gstrup 2007, 4/1961, 231-2) 
In these passages, L¿gstrup seems to concede here that Stangerup could be 
right that distrust comes first developmentally Ð or at least, it wouldnÕt matter 
to L¿gstrupÕs central point if it did, as that is not the kind of priority he really 
has in mind. But then, if the priority of trust over mistrust is not a matter of 
Ôscientific psychologyÕ (L¿gstrup 2007, 2-3/1961, 229-30), but some other kind 
of Ôfoundational relationÕ, what is it? 
 
2.2 Transcendental priority 
A second alternative is to argue that the priority is not merely empirical and 
developmental, but rather takes a transcendental form which in turn makes it 
ceteris paribus more rational to opt for an attitude of trust rather than distrust, 
regardless of how people may actually behave. That is, while as a matter of 
psychology particular individuals may start out with an attitude of distrust and 
not trust, this is not really relevant to L¿gstrupÕs position, as this cannot be the 
said to be the right attitude for people to have, as our forms of life must in 
general warrant the attitude of trust over that of distrust, as otherwise that kind 
of life would be impossible for us in various ways. 
 This approach seems to find support in what L¿gstrup has to say about 
the crucial case of language and speech, where he notes that Ôtrust is 
essential to every conversationÕ (L¿gstrup 1997, 14/2010, 24). In later work, 
L¿gstrup argues that Ô[t]o speak is to speak openlyÕ (L¿gstrup 2007, 
55/2013a, 100); and he gives an example based on an actual interview of his 
wife by a Nazi officer, who was trying to locate L¿gstrupÕs whereabouts, to 
show how difficult it is not to speak openly, even when faced by a ÔdestroyerÕ 
to whom telling the truth would lead to disaster, where this difficulty is taken to 
reflect the fundamental nature of speech itself: 
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Let me offer an illustration. Let us imagine that we stand facing a 
destroyer who is trying to win us for his cause, but we know that he will 
shun no means in doing so and that he is not to be trusted. Face to 
face with the destroyer, we discover how much effort it takes to remain 
on our guard. The thought that, by talking things out, we would be able 
to dissuade the destroyer from his destructive enterprise keeps 
presenting itself; there is no eradicating it once and for all. We must 
keep telling ourselves that it is an illusion to think that we could talk 
things out, and must continually bear in mind that anything we say will 
be used to put a third vulnerable party out of the way. But why is that 
thought so persistent? Why do we need to make such an effort to 
restrain ourselves, and why do we experience doing so as nothing less 
than contrary to nature? It is because we are opposing the requirement 
inherent in speech that speech be open. To speak is to speak openly. 
(L¿gstrup 2007, 54-55/2013a, 100; cf. also L¿gstrup 2007, 83-
5/1972,17-18) 
ÔThe requirement inherent in speech that speech be openÕ could be 
understood as a transcendental claim: Unless speech is open, in the sense 
that most people speak to each other truly and honestly, in a way that means 
they can be trusted in what they say, speech would be impossible as a form of 
life. For example, one could not learn to speak in the first place, and could not 
learn from testimony so that speech could not serve this fundamental 
epistemic role. And even more fundamentally, speech could not work at all 
unless people were mostly open and sincere, as otherwise we would have no 
way to assess content of what people were saying, if we could not generally 
take it on face value.15 
                                                        
15 Cf. Wittgenstein, where Hertzberg (1988, 308) draws attention to the 
following passages from On Certainty (Wittgenstein 1969):  
As children we learn facts; e.g., that every human being has a brain, 
and we take them on trust. I believe that there is an island, Australia, of 
such-and-such a shape, and so on and so on; I believe that I had 
great-grand-parents, that the people who gave themselves out as my 
parents really were my parents, etc. . . . 
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How strong is this transcendental claim? At its strongest, it would be 
the claim that all possible forms of speech would become impossible in 
conditions of dishonesty. But that may seem to make it implausible, as 
perhaps we can imagine conditions in which speech and testimony could still 
work even under these extreme circumstances. But even if this were so, all 
L¿gstrup would need is a more modest claim: that for our form of life, in the 
way that co-operation and communication work for us, this would be 
impossible if people in general could not be trusted to speak the truth: for this 
would still warrant us in treating trust as the default attitude, as we could be 
assured that in general it is reliable for the conditions in which we find 
ourselves.16 
Thus, it could be argued, Ôtrust is basicÕ when it comes to speech, as 
for us dishonesty and deception using speech must be parasitic on more 
fundamental honesty and truth-telling, in which case the default right attitude 
of the listener should be that of trust, not mistrust. Thus, just as Kant famously 
took his universalizability test of false promising to hinge on the impossibility 
                                                                                                                                                              
The child learns by believing the adult. Doubt comes after belief. 
(¤¤159-60) 
I really want to say that a language-game is only possible if one trusts 
something 
(I did not say 'can trust something'). (¤509)  
In this last passage, however, Wittgenstein is arguably talking more about 
reliance than the sort of trust that concerns L¿gstrup; the translation is 
somewhat misleading in this respect, as Wittgenstein is using Ôsich verlassen 
aufÕ, rather than ÔvertrauenÕ or ÔglaubenÕ, though cognates of ÔglaubenÕ are 
used in ¤159.  
16 Cf. also the quotation from Derrida cited previously: Ôelementary trust…is 
involved…in every address of the other. From the very first instant it is co-
extensive with this other and thus conditions every Òsocial bondÓ, every 
questioning, all knowledge, performativityÕ. 
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of this becoming the norm,17 so L¿gstrup could be read in a similar manner, 
where he puts the point in comparable terms: 
…we can only be insincere by means of the openness of speech. We 
can only be untruthful by dissimulation and by deceiving the other 
person. By what means? By the openness of speech. By this means 
we get the other to swallow the bait of our lies. We can only disregard 
the openness of speech by making it a feigned openness. Openness 
can never be eliminated, not even in the deepest deception. Mere 
speech involves it. It is just as much of a condition for lying as for telling 
the truth. (L¿gstrup 2007, 137/1982, 115) 
So, it seems we have a transcendental argument for why we should treat trust 
as prior to distrust, even if as a matter of empirical psychology people might 
start by distrusting others and then learn to trust: namely, because we know 
that human life could not function at all unless people can generally be 
trusted, we therefore have good grounds for taking trust as our default attitude 
to one another. 
But then, if we take this line, couldnÕt we also have a transcendental 
claim that refutes the psychological suggestion that people start by distrusting 
others? For, how could a community of distrustful people of this sort learn 
language or anything about the world through testimony, if the transcendental 
claims made above about speech are right? So isnÕt Stangerup also wrong 
about the developmental empirical claim, and canÕt L¿gstrup now 
demonstrate that too, so we can also claim priority in the first sense? Just this 
combination of views may seem to be what L¿gstrup is suggesting in the 
following passage: 
                                                        
17 Kant 2011, 73 [Akademie edition 4:422]: ÔNow, I then see at once that [false 
promising] could never hold as a universal law of nature and harmonize with 
itself, but must necessarily contradict itself. For the universality of a law that 
everyone, once he believes himself to be in need, could promise whatever he 
fancies with the intention not to keep it, would make the promise and the end 
one may pursue with it itself impossible, as no one would believe he was 
being promised anything, but would laugh about any such utterance, as a vain 
pretenceÕ. 
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Initially we believe one anotherÕs word; initially we trust one another. 
This may indeed seem strange, but it is part of what it means to be 
human. Human life could hardly exist if it were otherwise. We would 
simply not be able to live; our life would be impaired and wither away if 
we were in advance to distrust one another, if we were to suspect the 
other of thievery and falsehood from the very outset. (L¿gstrup 1997, 
8-9/2010, 17)18 
We might thus read L¿gstrup as advancing a transcendental claim designed 
to also refute the kind of empirical psychological point that someone like 
Stangerup thinks he can make. 
 However, as an interpretation of L¿gstrupÕs view this stands awkwardly 
with his apparent later willingness to distance himself from the psychological 
claim. But more importantly, perhaps, it also leaves him vulnerable to a more 
philosophical objection, namely that when it comes to the developmental 
claim in psychology, neither side is right. For, while the transcendental claim 
might show that we canÕt generally begin with the attitude of distrust, it still 
might be said that we could begin with an attitude that is not really trust either, 
as it is less substantive than that: for, it is just the absence of distrust, but not 
properly trust as such. To see the space for this possibility, consider the child 
who asks me for the first time on a long car journey: ÔAre we nearly there 
yet?Õ. If young enough, and if this really is the first time it has happened, and if 
generally our relations have given her no cause to question me up to this 
point, it could be argued that it just doesnÕt even occur to her that I might say 
anything other than the truth, so she is not taking it that my dependence on 
her figures in my thinking about her in a way that we have said is fundamental 
to the trusting attitude for L¿gstrup: she just takes it for granted that I will 
answer her correctly. It could thus be said that while she clearly doesnÕt 
distrust me, she actually doesnÕt trust me either, but is in some state prior to 
both, where the distinction has not even yet arisen.19 This then would be the 
                                                        
18 The third sentence might be translated more literally as: ÔIt would be hostile 
to life [livsfjendsk] to behave otherwiseÕ. 
19 Cf. Hertzberg, 1988, 316: ÔThe upshot of this is that it would be misleading 
to say, ÒThe child behaves in this way because he trusts the adultsÓ, rather he 
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objection to L¿gstrup when he writes that Ôdistrust is founded on trustÕ on the 
grounds that Ôdistrust arises when the individual has the experience that 
things do not go as he has trusted that they would goÕ, as distrust of this sort 
may arise not out of Ôdisappointed trustÕ but out of the disappointment of oneÕs 
expectations, but where having such expectations does not amount to trust 
proper.20 So even if we accept the transcendental approach to L¿gstrupÕs 
priority claim, it would still seem unwise to use this to also connect L¿gstrupÕs 
claim to the developmental question, where what we start out with may best 
be characterized in a more neutral manner altogether. 
 Nonetheless, even if this is right, we can still use the transcendental 
approach to make the first move we considered and to give content to a 
distinctive kind of priority thesis: namely, based on a transcendental claim 
about how speech works, if the question of trust vs distrust arises, it is right to 
default to trust, all things being equal. So far, then, we have argued that trust 
is prior to mistrust because we have transcendental grounds to think it will be 
the more warranted attitude than distrust; for example, given that speech 
requires openness to be possible at all, if I distrust what people are telling me, 
I am more likely to end up with false beliefs than true ones, or at least to lose 
out on getting true beliefs. So this seems to show that trust can be given a 
rational justification that distrust cannot, based on transcendental claims 
about what makes human life (or our kind of human life) possible in the first 
place. 
However, the problem with taking this to be the core of L¿gstrupÕs 
priority thesis is that it would seem to commit him to a predictive rather than 
affective conception of trust, whereas we argued previously that the opposite 
is the case. For, the role of the transcendental claim would appear to ground 
trust in something other than the role our dependence has in motivating the 
other person, and instead to ground it in what we take to be the way in which 
human life operates, for example that speech must involve openness where it 
                                                                                                                                                              
simply behaves in this way, and out of this relation (perhaps it could be less 
misleadingly described as an absence of distrust) there gradually evolve 
attitudes which may be called trustfulÕ. 
20 Cf. L¿gstrup, 1980, 223 (my translation). 
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is this that is said to warrant our attitude of trust. However, while this can 
certainly be enough for trust in the predictive sense, we nonetheless argued 
earlier that L¿gstrupÕs view of trust does not take this predictive form, so to 
treat the priority thesis in this transcendental manner would seem to run 
counter to conception of trust as he understands it.  
This issue relates to the complex question of L¿gstrupÕs distinction 
between the ethical demand itself, and our conventional moral norms, where 
this distinction cannot be fully explored here.21 But one way to understand it 
would be in terms of the predictive/affective contrast drawn above: whereas in 
trusting people within the conventional norms it is mainly the predictive notion 
that is in play, and which may therefore be given a transcendental grounding, 
when we think of trust in relation to the ethical demand it is the affective notion 
that is central, and so some other sense of priority is appropriate. Thus, within 
the terms of conventional morality, I might trust you to speak openly and if 
necessary justify this with the claim that speech could not operate unless this 
was generally the case, just as I might trust my car dealer to sell me a decent 
car and justify this with the thought that if too many car dealers were 
dishonest they would all be out of business; but this is not to justify trust in you 
in a deeper sense, as someone responsive to the ethical demand, because 
this is not to see my dependence on you as in any way responsible for the 
truths I expect you to utter.  
It may be, however, that there is another way to adopt a transcendental 
approach that would avoid this objection. Thus far, we have used a 
transcendental claim as grounds for the reliability of speech and other social 
practices, and thus as giving us rational grounds for trusting those involved in 
them that outweigh grounds for distrust, so making trust rationally prior. But 
we might offer a transcendental claim at another level, namely that unless 
people were generally trusting in their attitudes to one another, they could not 
function at all and so even be capable of distrust, so in this sense trust is 
basic: some degree of trust in others is a necessary condition for the 
possibility of distrust, which is what makes the former more fundamental than 
                                                        
21 For further discussion, see Fink forthcoming. 
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the latter in this transcendental sense. One writer on trust has put the 
trust/distrust relation in a way that might suggest this approach: 
Trust, in the broadest sense of confidence in oneÕs expectations, is a 
basic fact of social life. In many situations, of course, man can choose 
in certain respects whether or not to bestow trust. But a complete 
absence of trust would prevent him even from getting up in the 
morning. He would be prey to a vague sense of dread, to paralyzing 
fears. He would not even be capable of formulating distrust and making 
that a basis for precautionary measures, since this would presuppose 
trust in other directions. Anything and everything would be possible. 
Such abrupt confrontation with the complexity of the world at its most 
extreme is beyond human endurance. (Luhmann 1979, 4; cited 
Lagerspetz, 1998, 141)  
As has been noted (Lagerspetz, 1998, 141), this seems to be more than just a 
thesis about a Ôpsychological impossibilityÕ, and so to resemble a 
transcendental claim: we need trust in order to even be capable of distrust, 
and to this extent it is basic. 
 However, while avoiding the problems of the first transcendental 
approach, I would suggest that L¿gstrup would still not subscribe to this 
position. First, as before, the conception of trust involved is not the same as 
L¿gstrupÕs, and it is not clear the transcendental claim would be plausible on 
his conception. For, while Ôconfidence in oneÕs expectationsÕ might be 
necessary to function at all and so to be capable of distrust, this is not trust as 
L¿gstrup envisages it, as it is merely predictive trust; but conversely, it seems 
less plausible to claim that trust as L¿gstrup does envisage it is necessary for 
us to function sufficiently to be capable of distrust, as predictive trust would 
seem to be adequate for this. But secondly, because this is just a claim of 
transcendental priority, namely that trust is a necessary condition for distrust, 
this position tells us nothing regarding the normative relation of trust and 
distrust; that is, it just tells us we canÕt have the latter without the former, but 
not what makes the former better than the latter. Of course, we could answer 
this by going back to the first transcendental approach, as that argues that 
conditions for speech and communication mean that trust will be more reliable 
than distrust, and so should be preferred on rational grounds; but we have 
  19 
seen reasons to reject that approach as well, from L¿gstrupÕs perspective. As 
we shall now see, however, the normative question is important to L¿gstrupÕs 
view, so is there another option? 
 
2.3 Axiological priority 
To appreciate how this might be possible, it is useful to return to the passage 
with which we began, and L¿gstrupÕs apparently paradoxical claim there that 
trust is basic in so far as it doesnÕt really require justification in relation to 
distrust, because we can only view the latter as the Ôdeficient formÕ of the 
former, and so as inferior to it in first place: 
Trust and distrust are not two parallel ways of life. Trust is basic; 
distrust is the absence of trust. This is why we do not normally advance 
arguments and justifications for trust as we do for distrust. To use a 
modern philosophical expression, distrust is the Ôdeficient formÕ of trust. 
(L¿gstrup 1997, 18 note 5/2010, 28 note 1) 
The Ômodern philosophical expressionÕ L¿gstrup is referring to is to be found 
in Heidegger, where in Being and Time Heidegger speaks about deficient 
modes of being-in-the-world and of solicitude, for example. 22  How does 
putting things in these terms help us with our puzzle? 
 To see how it might, it is worth returning to L¿gstrupÕs reply to 
Stangerup. Here, L¿gstrup makes clear that his reason for drawing the 
contrast between children and adults was not to make the claim about 
developmental priority (that trust comes first in time), but to make a claim 
about how we see the life of the trusting child to be Ômore true, more genuineÕ 
than that of the distrustful adult: 
The point is, the difference between child and adult lies not only in a 
person being a child first, and then becoming an adult; we all find that 
the two are essentially different kinds of existence. And do we not, 
indeed, regard the childÕs life as being, in certain respects, more true, 
more genuine than the adultÕs life Ð precisely because, among other 
                                                        
22 Cf. Heidegger 1962, ¤12, 83 and ¤26, 158. L¿gstrup makes the connection 
with Heidegger explicit in L¿gstrup 1950, 30, and in L¿gstrup 1995, II, 
355/1982, 220: Ôin HeideggerÕs words, mistrust is trustÕs deficient modeÕ. 
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things, trust plays such an enormous, decisive role? (L¿gsrup 2007, 
3/1961, 230) 
This passage, I suggest, should be understood in axiological terms, as 
claiming that the life of the child is better than the life of the adult, and the role 
of trust in it is crucial to making it so; and precisely because it is a good of this 
sort, we do not need any kind of argument to justify adopting it over distrust 
wherever this is possible.23 
 One way of getting at what L¿gstrup has in mind here, I think, is to 
compare the case of trust and distrust to that of health and illness. Here it 
seems plausible to argue that health is the primary notion, as illness can only 
be conceived as the absence of health, of which illness is the privation or 
deficient form. And this means we must accord a prior value to health over 
illness, so while it always makes sense to ask (e.g. of a smoker): Ôwhy choose 
to be ill rather than healthy?Õ, it doesnÕt generally make sense to ask (e.g. of 
someone exercising) Ôwhy choose to be healthy rather than ill?Õ; a question of 
this sort can only make sense in special circumstances, that are themselves 
less than normal or ideal (e.g. of someone starving themselves in a hunger 
strike, where a fellow prisoner might ask why the hunger striker has decided 
to eat the food that has been given to him). To ask the question is to seek for 
an explanation for something which (if you understand the relative 
significance of health and illness) shouldnÕt need to be explained or even 
arise. 
 We might then hold something similar in the case of trust and distrust: 
that is, we could hold that trust is the primary notion, as mistrust can only be 
defined or understood as the absence of trust, of which mistrust is the 
privation or deficient form. And this means we must accord a prior value to 
trust over mistrust, so while it always makes sense to ask: Ôwhy decide to 
distrust rather than trust?Õ, it doesnÕt generally make sense to ask Ôwhy decide 
to trust rather than distrust?Õ; this question can only make sense in special 
circumstances, that are themselves less than normal or ideal (e.g. in 
conditions where one has been fooled before). As L¿gstrup himself puts it: 
                                                        
23 This approach is also discussed in Rabjerg 2007.  
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In order to establish the foundational relation between trust and 
distrust, I have mentioned that one normally does not ask anyone to 
account for the trust they might have in someone else, but rather for 
their distrust of someone else. (L¿gstrup 2007, 4/1961, 231) 
To ask the question is to seek for an explanation for something which (if you 
understand the relative significance of trust over distrust) shouldnÕt need to be 
explained or even arise as a question. 
L¿gstrup thus argues that at a conceptual level, it is part of the concept 
of trust that it is positively assessed, as an Ôethically descriptive phenomenonÕ 
(or what we might nowadays call a Ôthick ethical conceptÕ): 
Take trust and distrust, for instance: the positivity of trust and the 
negativity of distrust are not some evaluative accretions of which trust 
and distrust are the subjects, but inhere in the phenomena themselves. 
Positivity and negativity, respectively, reside in the very meanings of 
these two words. It runs counter to the intrinsic nature of trust, and is 
contrary to the very meaning of the term, to evaluate trust as a 
negative phenomenon. Strictly speaking, we are precluded from 
conceiving trust as something negative. We may, of course, appraise 
trust as a negative thing, but this can only come about through our 
applying a perspective to trust in which we discount what trust itself 
imparts to us, namely, that it is positive. This is not merely a theoretical 
possibility Ð it does happen that, despite its nature, we appraise trust 
negatively because in a particular situation it is dangerous. Trust can 
be exploited; and so in bringing up a child we have to caution him or 
her against a trusting attitude in certain sorts of circumstances. But that 
does not make trust a neutral phenomenon which we are free to 
conceive of positively or negatively. It is only possible to evaluate it 
negatively by flouting its positive nature. The same applies, of course, 
to a positive evaluation of distrust: it is possible only in spite of the 
negativity of distrust. (L¿gstrup 2007, 115/1972, 48)24 
                                                        
24 Cf. also L¿gstrup 1997, 249/2010, 279, where L¿gstrup identifies trust 
along with love as one of the Ôrealities which we have summarized as the 
goodness of our human lifeÕ, which then means that Ô[t]rust is there in 
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So, L¿gstrup argues, trust is like the other Ôsovereign expressions of lifeÕ, such 
as mercy, love and hope, that by default can only be evaluated positively, and 
thus have a priority over their Ôdeficient formsÕ as a result. 
 Nonetheless, the question can arise why trust is of positive value, what 
is it about trust that makes this the case? L¿gstrup makes clear that this is 
tied up with a proper understanding of the fundamental operations that govern 
life, much like those that relate to health, and being cut off from those 
operations cannot but cause us damage. Thus, the attitude of trust is an 
important part of the human good, without which we would be greatly 
impoverished, so that a world in which trust is possible is a better world than 
one in which it is not, thus making trust axiologically fundamental.25 But how, 
more precisely, is this so? 
One central reason can be found in the way L¿gstrup identifies trust as 
crucial to a certain openness we can have to one another, which is lost in 
conditions of distrust:  
Not to let the other person emerge through words, deeds, and conduct, 
but to hinder this instead by our suspicion and by the picture we have 
formed of him or her as a result of our antipathy is a denial of life. 
(L¿gstrup 1997, 14/2010, 23) 
For L¿gstrup, this openness is characteristic of trust, and also characteristic of 
love and sympathy, because in these relations we take people at face value 
as they present themselves to us and connect to them directly, rather than 
forming a certain image or picture of their character, a theory about what 
makes them tick, and using that to define them for us. We can form such 
theories for various reasons, but L¿gstrup thinks that what is important about 
the trusting relation is that it breaks them down as we go back to seeing the 
person again, rather than defining them in terms of our picture of them: 
                                                                                                                                                              
advance, as surely as reserve and mistrust are a lack of trust and not the 
reverseÕ, hereby clearly suggesting an axiological priority of trust over distrust. 
25 Cf. L¿gstrup 1995, II, 355/1982, 220: Ô[E]xternal conditions either cause 
trust and provide good conditions for growth, or they harm it at its very source 
and provide poor conditions for growthÕ. 
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The basic character of trust is revealed in yet another way. In love and 
sympathy there is no impulse to investigate the other personÕs 
character. We do not construct an image of who he or she is… If, on 
the other hand, we are not in sympathy with the other person…then we 
begin to form a picture of the otherÕs character… However, when we 
are in the direct association with that person this picture usually breaks 
down; the personal presence erases it…Only where the proof of her 
unreliability has in the most positive sense become an ingrown distrust, 
or where the irritation and antipathy have shut me off completely, does 
the picture continue to stand. (L¿gstrup 1997, 13/2010, 22-23)26 
Distrust for L¿gstrup thus amounts to a denial of life because it is to put a 
picture of the person in place of the person themselves,27 and to define them 
in terms of what they have been rather than allowing them to be capable of 
making themselves new, just as (L¿gstrup thinks) life itself can renew itself. 
Thus, he writes, ÔWe might call this a trust in life itself, in the ongoing renewal 
of lifeÕ (L¿gstrup 1997, 14/2010, 23). 
 There are therefore two fundamentally damaging effects in a world 
where trust is not possible, which shows how crucial it is to our good Ð one 
                                                        
26 A more accurate translation of the last sentence would be: ÔOnly where it is 
established that the other cannot be trusted, and where this has literally 
become an ingrown distrust, or where irritation and antipathy have shut one 
off completely, does the picture continue to standÕ. 
27 While L¿gstrup never gives up the view that this is to be avoided, he later 
recognizes that one can also sometimes become so focused on the person 
that one becomes hypnotized by their presence, as it were, which can also 
create problems in its own way, by leading us to just take account of their 
current concerns: ÔAs the meeting [with the other] is absorbing me, it clips my 
imagination. My imagination cannot move freely in the otherÕs history and 
world, for my attitude, thought, and feeling are narrowed to being an answer 
to what is currently occupying the other person and what he requires and 
expects from meÕ (L¿gstrup 1983, 51; cited and translated in Bugge 
forthcoming). 
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that involves damage to the person who is distrusted, and one that involve 
damage to the person who distrusts. 
 The argument for damage to the distrusted person might be put as 
follows: 
(1) As living creatures, we have the capacity for renewal, which must be 
realized if our lives are to go well. 
(2) This capacity cannot be realized if we are confined by the picture or 
theory imposed on us by others. 
(3) Trust involves relating to another without a picture or theory. 
(4) So being trusted by others enables us to function in the right way. 
(5) To distrust is to impose a picture or theory on someone. 
(6) So to distrust someone is to risk blocking their capacity for renewal, 
and thus to prevent their life going well. 
And the argument for damage to the distrusting person might be put as 
follows: 
(1) The capacity of persons for renewal is central to the value of life; it is 
how lives develop for the good. 
(2) If we fail to recognize (1), we lose our sense of how life can be 
bettered, and if we lose this, we lose the Ôzest for lifeÕ or the Ôcourage 
to beÕ in our own lives. 
(3)  To lose oneÕs Ôzest for lifeÕ or Ôcourage to beÕ is to be damaged. 
(4) To recognize (1) one must not see others as confined by a picture or 
theory   one has about them. 
(5) Trust involves relating to another without a picture or theory. 
(6) So trust enables us to recognize (1) and is therefore sufficient to avoid 
the damage that is (3).  
And one might then construct a more general argument that brings in damage 
to both parties, through the distrusting relation:  
(1) Relating to another directly, without a picture or a theory, is central to 
having a proper relation to them as living beings, without interposing 
anything into that relation. 
(2) Trust relates us to another without a picture or theory.  
(3) So trust involves a proper relation to others. 
(4) To distrust is to have a picture or theory. 
  25 
(5) So distrust does not allow for a proper relation to others.  
Trust is thus essential to us as a constitutive basic human good, alongside the 
other Ôsovereign expressions of lifeÕ, in the way that distrust is not; distrust is 
rather a deprivation of those goods, and so less fundamental, just in the way 
that illness is a deprivation of health. 
 To understand what L¿gstrup might have in mind here, it is instructive 
to consider the example of Charles Myriel, the Bishop of Digne in Victor 
HugoÕs classic novel Les Misrables. The Bishop, whose character and 
history are presented in the first chapter of the book, then goes on to show not 
just compassion and pity towards the ex-convict Jean Valjean, but also trust in 
allowing him into his home at all, and particularly letting him sleep with access 
to the silverware owned by the household. It is clear that while the BishopÕs 
sister Mademoiselle Baptistine is prepared to go along with him out of respect 
for his judgement and goodness, the BishopÕs housekeeper Madame Magloire 
thinks that he has gone too far this time, and is profoundly shocked by his 
actions in trusting Valjean. What seems to be emphasized by HugoÕs 
narrative, at least from a L¿gstrupian perspective, is that while everyone else 
sees Valjean as what he has done and thus become Ð a criminal, a vagrant, 
an outcast Ð the Bishop (and thus to a lesser extent his sister) see him as an 
individual human being standing before the Bishop as such. Even Valjean 
seems shocked by the openness the Bishop shows to him, and seeks to 
remind him of how he should be categorized: 
ÔMme Magloire,Õ said the bishop, Ôwill you please lay another 
place?Õ 
The man [Valjean] moved nearer to the light of the table-lamp, 
seeming not to understand. 
ÔItÕs not like that,Õ he said. ÔWerenÕt you listening? IÕm a convict, a 
felon, IÕve served in the galleys.Õ He pulled a sheet of yellow paper out 
of his pocket and unfolded it. ÔThis is my ticket-of-leave Ð yellow, as 
you see. This is why everybody turns me away. Do you want to read it? 
I can read. There were classes in prison for anyone who wanted to 
learn. You can see what it says Ð ÒJean Valjean, released convict, born 
in ÐÓ not that that matters  ÒÐ served nineteen years, five years for 
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robbery with violence, fourteen years for four attempts to escape Ð a 
very dangerous man.Ó So there you are. (Hugo 1983, 85) 
The Bishop, however, ignores all this and insists he is not interested, where in 
a letter from his sister that is then quoted in the text, she ponders on his 
behaviour, emphasizing in particular that Ômy brother did not so much as ask 
the man where he was born. He did not ask his story. For the story would 
have included some account of his crimes and my brother clearly wished to 
avoid all reference to theseÕ. She gives the following explanation of why the 
Bishop behaved in this manner: ÔHe must have reflected that the man, this 
Jean Valjean, was sufficiently oppressed already with the burden of his 
wretchedness, and that it was better to distract his thoughts and make him 
feel, if only for a little while, that he was a man like any otherÕ (Hugo 1983, 
90). Again, from L¿gstrupÕs perspective, we might understand HugoÕs point to 
be that to trust Valjean just is to see him as no longer defined by his past, 
whereas conversely to see Valjean through the eyeÕs of the BishopÕs 
distrustful housekeeper is not really to see the person as such, but all the 
things he stands for Ð a convict, a felon, a criminal with a yellow ticket-of-
leave. Like L¿gstrupÕs child, we might also think this gives the Bishop a Ôjoy in 
living, a courage to beÕ which the housekeeper, for all that we understand her 
sensible caution and reasonable doubts, can never possess, partly because 
she cannot see life as capable of the kind of renewal and reform in the same 
way as the Bishop can, while also being deprived of the kind of direct 
interaction with others that his attitude of trust also makes possible.  
L¿gstrup is of course not claiming that such distrust is never warranted, 
or denying that it could in some sense become ingrained in a person for good 
reason; but nonetheless trust is prior to distrust as this could not but cut us off 
from a better way of relating to others and to life itself. As someone who lived 
through the Nazi experience both in Germany and in Denmark, and the 
consequent erosion in relations of trust that this entailed, this must be seen as 
the fundamental lesson L¿gstrup learned: not that society could not function 
in such conditions, because in some sense it did, but that it is still a 
pathological form of human life, in which important goods were lost as 
different and ÔdeficientÕ kinds of inter-relations took hold that required people 
to be committed to a limited way of understanding one another as living 
  27 
beings. Such is the force of our sense that it is limited in this way, that even 
when faced with Ôa destroyerÕ we may find it difficult not to be open and 
trusting, as even in such an encounter it can be hard not to hope that this 
goodness can be realized, even while we know it cannot. 
It might be objected to this account, however, that if the priority of trust 
is viewed axiologically in this manner, and we then explain the value of trust in 
the way I have claimed that L¿gstrup does, it leaves him open to a 
fundamental difficulty: namely, wonÕt we now have a reason to trust others 
based on the goodness that such trust brings to our lives, but isnÕt that 
precisely the wrong reason to trust others, so that if we give it this axiological 
basis it cannot then function properly? Indeed, it could be said, we might think 
of the Bishop in precisely these terms: because his positive view of the world 
is so important to him, this is why he trusts Valjean, thus leading him to trust 
for the wrong reason and in a way that blinds him to all the reasons he has to 
distrust; but the housekeeper has no such positive view of life, so she is more 
clear-eyed about the grounds she has to distrust Valjean, so that for her the 
attitude of trust is operating as it should. 
Now, L¿gstrup himself arguably has an interesting response to this 
difficulty.28 For, he suggests, along with all the sovereign expressions of life, it 
is not possible to trust for instrumental reasons Ð for then one no longer is 
trusting, so that while trusting others may bring us important goods, there 
cannot be the reasons why we trust. So the Ôwrong reasonsÕ problem cannot 
arise: 
This unconditionality [of sovereign expressions of life, like trust] 
manifests itself in the fact that as soon as an expression of life is called 
upon to serve another purpose than its own, it disappears or is 
transformed into its opposite…. Mercy consists in an impulse to free 
another person from suffering. If it serves another purpose, such as 
stabilizing society, it is replaced by indifference towards the other 
personÕs suffering. The ulterior motive transforms mercy into its own 
opposite. 
                                                        
28 For helpful more general discussions of this issue, see Williams 2002, 90-
93, and Faulkner 2011, 174-5. 
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 This is why the spontaneous expressions of life defy all 
justification. The very moment we seek to give a reason for them, we 
make them contingent upon that which we present as our reason, and 
they become corrupted right then and there. We have made them a 
means to obtain a goal other than their own: a means for the goal that 
is present in the justification. (L¿gstrup 2007, 128/1982, 107) 
And this argument seems very plausible in the case of trust, at least as 
L¿gstrup conceives it: for, as we have seen, to trust is to be open to the other 
person, to see them for themselves rather than through a picture or a theory. 
But, if you trust the other for the good such trust brings you, as a way of 
helping retain a positive view of life, this is just another way to cut oneself off 
from the person concerned, by focusing in on yourself instead. This is why, if 
we did find out that the Bishop trusted Valjean because he wishes to retain 
the goods that come with trust, we would no longer say he trusted Valjean at 
all. Thus, while the axiological view can explain why Ôtrust is basicÕ in the 
manner we have explained, it does not threaten to undermine the grounds for 
trust in a way that would be problematic, for by the logic of L¿gstrupÕs account 
of trust, the value of trust cannot serve as the reason for trust and so distort 
trust in this way.  
 
 2.4 Ontological priority 
 We have seen, then, that we can take L¿gstrupÕs intriguing claim that 
Ôtrust is basicÕ in an axiological manner: that is, a world in which trust is 
possible is better than a world in which it is absent, and not just because lack 
of trust will damage or make impossible other human relations (though it 
doubtless will), but because the world will be deprived of goods intrinsic to 
trust itself, which are taken away or threatened once we live in a world of 
distrust. In this way, then, trust is not parallel or equal to distrust, but rather 
what is basic: not because we start out by trusting and then learn to distrust; 
or because we have better reasons for trusting than distrusting; or because 
we cannot distrust unless we trust; but because trust is of prior value, and 
thus distrust can only be its deprivation or deficient form.  
 However, this is not quite the end of the story. For, in L¿gstrupÕs way of 
thinking (which cannot be fully set out here), this kind of axiological priority is 
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closely related to another form of priority that can be attributed to trust: 
namely, what I have called ontological priority, which is captured in L¿gstrupÕs 
remark (to which his claim that Ôtrust is basicÕ is added in a footnote) that 
Ô[t]rust is not of our own making; it is givenÕ (L¿gstrup 1997, 18/2010, 27).29 
For L¿gstrup, essentially what this means is that we do not create or bring 
about trust as a practice or norm, in the way that we bring about practices or 
norms like driving on the left, marriage or even property, which govern our 
various social institutions in ways that we hope are for the best. These 
practices or norms are brought into being by us in a contractual or quasi-
contractual manner, and are thus goods that we bring into the world and over 
which we have control. But there are other structures which are fundamental 
to life itself, of which we are part, that we could not bring about in this way as 
without them we could not come to be at all, and trust (along with the other 
sovereign expressions of life) are structures of this sort, as without trust we 
could not function as the creatures we are in the first place, given our 
vulnerability and interdependence. In this sense, then, Ôtrust is not of our own 
makingÕ, but is something given with the nature of human life as such, and 
thus a ÔgoodÕ for which we are not ourselves responsible, and for which we 
can therefore claim no credit.30 By contrast, distrust is not ontologically basic 
in this way, as human life could function perfectly well without distrust, where 
it only becomes required because we distort life through our own selfishness, 
which is why it is not essential to the proper functioning of human life itself, 
and why the fact of its existence is to our discredit. 
 It should be clear, therefore, that on L¿gstrupÕs account, the claims of 
axiological and ontological priority need to be thought together: the latter claim 
is not a value neutral one, for example like the claim that individuals are prior 
to social agents as the latter are not possible without the former. Rather, the 
ontological priority of trust stems from the fact that trust is a requirement or 
                                                        
29 A more accurate translation would be: ÔTrust is not down to us. It is givenÕ. 
30 Cf. L¿gstrup 1997, 141/2010,161 (translation modified), where L¿gstrup 
rejects the thought that trust and love can be subtracted from our evil Ð Ôas 
though trust and natural love were not given to man, but were his own 
achievements and could be credited to the account of the selfÕ. 
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condition for the proper functioning of human life, which is what makes it 
something we do not create ourselves (ontological priority), but also makes it 
a fundamental good and thus prior in this sense too, as having a value that is 
also not attributed to it by us (axiological priority).31  
 This also shows why the two kinds of priority we rejected Ð 
psychological and transcendental Ð may nonetheless come to have some 
place in L¿gstrupÕs account in a suitably modified way. For while we argued 
that L¿gstrupÕs view does not operate at just a psychological level, and we 
can now see why, nonetheless we can also see why he appeals to 
psychological evidence of the damaging effects of distrust on children and 
adults. And likewise, while we also argued that L¿gstrupÕs view does not 
argue primarily for the rational priority of trust over distrust on the grounds that 
the latter makes the former possible, nonetheless his claims about the 
ontological priority of trust do nonetheless contain what might be thought of as 
a world-directed transcendental claim, namely that trust is a necessary 
condition to the proper functioning of human life on which distrust is parasitic, 
and thus is a normative structure in which we are grounded as a ÔgivenÕ, 
rather than something we create for ourselves and for which we can claim any 
credit.32 The hope is, therefore, that having pulled apart these strands in 
L¿gstrupÕs complex conception of trust and also how they relate to one 
                                                        
31 Cf. L¿gstrup 2007, 115/1972, 48, where both claims come together when 
L¿gstrup writes of a phenomenon like trust: ÔWhether such phenomena are 
positive or negative, good or bad, is not first determined in our evaluation of 
them; it is not first decided in our engaging with them. They make me their 
own before I make them my own. They have intimated to me what is good 
and bad before I consider the matter myself and evaluate it. This is the reason 
for calling the positive expressions of life sovereignÕ. 
32 Cf. L¿gstrup 1962, 532: ÔSuspicion lives at the expense of trust, the evil will 
to overcome the other is parasitic on the created possibility of lifeÕ. 
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another, we can now see more clearly what it means for him to claim that trust 
is basic, and what makes that claim of significant interest.33 
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